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TORTS--CHANGES IN THE ARKANSAS LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT:
WHAT'S UP, Doc? ARONSON v. HARpIMAN, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d
832 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Douglas Harriman, a then-eighteen year old suffering from scoliosis,
became paralyzed after undergoing an operation to correct the abnormal
curvature of his spine.' Harriman brought an action against Dr. James
Aronson, the orthopedic surgeon who performed the surgery, and alleged
that the physician failed to obtain Harriman's informed consent to the
operation.' Harriman contended that Dr. Aronson did not disclose the risk
of paralysis.'
After reviewing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held that Dr. Aronson failed in his duty to disclose the risk of paralysis to
Harriman and that this failure constituted a breach of the standard of care
under the doctrine of informed consent.4 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed a nearly one million dollar jury verdict and judgment in favor of
Douglas Harriman.'
Prior to the Aronson decision, Arkansas case law reflected a trend of
defeats for plaintiffs who brought actions against physicians on the basis of
lack of informed consent.6 The plaintiffs in these cases were unsuccessful
because they were unable to satisfy their burden of presenting evidence as
required by statute.7 In Aronson, the court allowed Douglas Harriman to
recover even though Harriman failed to present expert testimony on the
applicable standard of care, the production of which Arkansas statutory law
requires! The only evidence regarding the standard of care came during the
presentation of Dr. Aronson's case.9 In light of earlier decisions by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, this evidence was insufficient to satisfy the
level of proof required by statute."0 The Supreme Court of Arkansas also
adopted an objective standard under which to evaluate causation: whether
a reasonable patient in Harriman's position would have foregone the surgery
1. Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 362, 901 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1995).
2. Id. at 362, 901 S.W.2d at 834.
3. Id. at 365, 901 S.W.2d at 836.
4. Id. at 370-74, 901 S.W.2d at 839-41.
5. Id. at 361-62, 901 S.W.2d at 834.
6. See, e.g., Brumley v. Naples, 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995); Grice v.
Atkinson, 308 Ark. 637, 826 S.W.2d 810 (1992); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 597
S.W.2d 88 (1980). See infra part III.E.
7. See infra part III.E.; see also infra note 178.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra parts IV and V.
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had he been adequately informed." However, the explicit language of the
applicable statute indicates that the material inquiry is whether the injured
party would have withheld consent had he been informed of the material
risks.' 2 As a result, the court permitted Douglas Harriman to recover even
though he could not state that he would have foregone the surgery had he
known of the risk of paralysis.' 3 Although the result in Aronson seems to
promote the notion of patient autonomy, a concept that is central to the issue
of informed consent, the outcome is irreconcilable with prior case law
established in light of the applicable statute. 4
II. CASE HISTORY
Harriman was in the ninth grade 5 when a school nurse discovered
scoliosis during a routine examination. 6 Scoliosis is a significant lateral
curvature that deviates from the normally straight, vertical line of the
spine." As Harriman went through the next two years of high school, he
experienced a substantial amount of pain in his left side as a result of his
condition.' 8 When Harriman was seventeen years old, he and his parents
met with Dr. Aronson at Arkansas Children's Hospital in an attempt to find
a solution to Harriman's problem.19 After discovering that a brace would
not work because Harriman's body was fully developed, Dr. Aronson
discussed the possibility of surgery with the Harrimans.2 °
Harriman underwent scoliosis surgery on September 4, 1991.21 Dr.
Aronson performed the operation, which involved the implantation of
Cotrel-Dubousset (CD) rods into the spinal cord.22 After the implantation
of the rods and during the "wake-up test, ' 23 Dr. Aronson determined that
11. See infra part IV.
12. See infra parts IV and V; see also infra note 226.
13. See infra part IV.
14. See infra parts IV and V.
15. Brief for Appellant at 33, Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832
(1995) (No. 94-1218).
16. Id. at 9.
17. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 633 (1987).
18. Appellant's Brief at 33, Aronson (No. 94-1218).
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 10-11. According to Dr. Aronson, he never told the Harrimans that surgery
was mandatory. However, he noted that the curvature in Harriman's spine was at a high risk
to progress in the future. Id. at 41.
21. Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 362, 901 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1995).
22. Id. The Cotrel-Dubousset method of instrumentation was developed in France in
1984. LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES
§ 16.17 (3d ed. 1993).
23. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 362, 901 S.W.2d at 834. The "wake-up test" is a stage during
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Harriman could not move his feet.24 Following the removal of the rods and
the administration of other tests, Dr. Aronson realized that Harriman was
paralyzed from the chest down." Harriman filed a complaint in Pulaski
County Circuit Court against Dr. Aronson alleging negligent medical care
and treatment and failure to obtain Harriman's informed consent to the
procedure.26
At trial, Janet Harriman, Douglas's mother, testified that although she
could not recall whether Dr. Aronson had informed her that paralysis was
a risk of the procedure, she would have remembered had she been told.27
During cross-examination of Mrs. Harriman, the court allowed Dr. Aronson
to admit into evidence a notation made in a medical chart by Dr. Neal
Lenticum, a resident physician who treated Harriman.28 In the notation, Dr.
Lenticum indicated that the risks and benefits of the spinal surgery had been
discussed with Douglas Harriman and his parents.29 The court also
permitted Dr. Aronson to admit into evidence a consent form signed by
Janet and Douglas Harriman, and a progress note written by Dr. Aronson.3°
In the progress note, Dr. Aronson indicated that he had discussed with the
family the risks of neurological damage. 3' However, neither the consent
form nor the medical chart contained a specific reference to the risk of
paralysis.32
the procedure in which the anesthesiologist temporarily decreases anesthesia and brings the
patient "to a level of consciousness in order to determine whether [the patient can] move his
feet and toes." Id. See also 2 LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND
ALLIED SPECIALTIES § 16.17, at 763 (3d ed. 1993).
24. Appellant's Brief at 51, Aronson (No. 94-1218).
25. Id. at 52.
26. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 362, 901 S.W.2d at 834. Harriman also named as defendants
in the suit American Physicians Insurance Exchange, Dr. Aronson's malpractice insurance
carrier, and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the insurance carrier for Arkansas
Children's Hospital. The insurance carriers were removed as defendants after the trial court
granted American's motion to dismiss and St. Paul was non-suited. Id.
27. Id. at 363, 901 S.W.2d at 835. Mrs. Harriman said she asked Dr. Aronson whether
there was a possibility that her son could be disabled and he stated, "I have done a number
of these operations, and I have never had anything happen yet." Id. Harlan Harriman,
Douglas's father, corroborated much of Mrs. Harriman's testimony. Id. at 364, 901 S.W.2d
at 835. He admitted that the subject of disability arose after a nurse addressed the topic in
a discussion with Mrs. Harriman. According to Mr. Harriman, however, the possibility of
paralysis was never specifically mentioned. Id.






Dr. John David Warbritton III, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon,
presented medical expert testimony on behalf of Harriman.3 Dr. Warbritton
indicated that Dr. Aronson's medical treatment harmed Harriman because
it deviated from the standard of care expected of orthopedic surgeons
practicing in Little Rock, Arkansas, or a similar locality.34 However, the
trial court refused to permit Dr. Warbritton to testify regarding the standard
of care for informed consent.35 When Harriman's counsel attempted to elicit
testimony from Dr. Warbritton on the standard of care, Dr. Aronson
objected on the grounds that the information had not been provided in
discovery and that Dr. Warbritton was not a competent expert to testify on
the issue.36 The trial court sustained the objection.37
After Dr. Warbritton's testimony, Dr. Aronson moved in limine to
preclude Harriman from testifying on the issue of informed consent.38
Specifically, Dr. Aronson argued that the record lacked sufficient evidence
to submit the issue to the jury.39 The court denied Dr. Aronson's motion. '
Harriman testified that he never considered the possibility of paralysis
and that he was uncertain as to whether he would have declined to undergo
the surgery had he known of the risk.4' After Harriman rested, Dr. Aronson
moved for directed verdict based upon his argument that Harriman failed to
provide competent testimony as required by statute.42 The trial court denied
33. Id. at 364, 901 S.W.2d at 835. Dr. Warbritton noted having a special interest in
spinal surgery; however, he also indicated that his practice is not limited to one particular
specialty. Appellant's Brief at 25, Aronson (No. 94-1218). Dr. Warbritton also testified that
he did not presently perform scoliosis surgery. id. at 26. Although Dr. Warbritton never
examined Harriman personally, he did review his medical records. Aronson. 321 Ark. at 364,
901 S.W.2d at 835.
34. Brief for Appellee at 2, Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995)
(No. 94-1218). According to Dr. Warbritton, the fact that an increased risk of neurological
damage accompanies surgery performed with CD rods as opposed to Harrington rods is
generally known. Appellant's Brief at 26, Aronson (No. 94-1218). However, Dr. Warbritton
conceded that the use of CD rods was appropriate in Harriman's case. Id. at 30. In Dr.
Warbritton's opinion, the spinal damage was caused by an interruption of blood flow to the
spinal cord that resulted from "excessive instrumentation" at the point where the spinal cord
injury began. Id. at 28.




39. Id. at 364, 901 S.W.2d at 835-36.
40. Id. at 364, 901 S.W.2d at 836.
41. Id. at 365, 901 S.W.2d at 836. Harriman testified that Dr. Aronson did not mention
the risk of paralysis to him. In Harriman's own words, "If Dr. Aronson had mentioned the
chance of paralysis, I wouldn't say that I would not have had the surgery. I still can't say
that I wouldn't have had it, but it would have made the decision a lot harder to decide."
Appellant's Brief at 35, Aronson (No. 94-1218).
42. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 365, 901 S.W.2d at 836. Dr. Aronson argued that ARK. CODE
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the motion.43 Thereafter, Dr. Aronson made another motion for directed
verdict based upon his argument that Harriman failed to state that he would
have foregone the surgery had he known of the possibility of paralysis."
Again the trial court denied the motion.45
Testifying on his own behalf, Dr. Aronson stated that he informed the
Harrimans of the procedure's risks and benefits, including neurological risks
involved when operating near the spinal cord." Dr. Albert Sanders testified
on behalf of Dr. Aronson and stated that Dr. Aronson's medical treatment
of Harriman was appropriate.47 Dr. Sanders stated during cross-examination
that it was appropriate to inform a patient of paralysis in this case because
it is a risk of the" type of surgery involved. After Dr. Aronson presented.
his case, he renewed his motions for directed verdicts, which the court
denied.49
The trial court instructed the jury on the separate issues of negligence
and informed consent.50 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Aronson
on the issue of negligent medical care and in favor of Harriman on the issue
of informed consent.5" The trial court awarded $931,287.53 to Harriman in
accordance with the jury's verdict.52 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed the judgment.53 Based on the court's conclusion that Dr. Aronson
waived any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence when he went
forward in presenting his defense, the court held that the trial court did not
err in denying Dr. Aronson's various motions for directed verdict.'
Furthermore, despite the fact that Harriman could not state with certainty
that he would have forgone the surgery had Dr. Aronson informed him of
ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987) required Harriman to produce expert testimony to
show that the information Dr. Aronson provided was not in compliance with information
given by other physicians with similar training and experience in the same or a similar
locality at the time of the surgery. Id. See infira note 178 and accompanying text.
43. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 365, 901 S.W.2d at 836.
44. Id. Dr. Aronson argued that ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1987)
required Harriman to make such a statement in order to meet his burden. Aronson, 321 Ark.
at 370-71, 901 S.W.2d at 839. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
45. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 365, 901 S.W.2d at 836.
46. Id. at 365-66, 901 S.W.2d at 836. Dr. Aronson testified that in his explanation of
the neurological risk involved, he said to the Harrimans, "[I]f you injure a nerve in a hand
that means a limited loss of feeling and strength. But if you injure the spinal cord a
neurologic problem means paralysis." Id.





52. Id. at 366, 901 S.W.2d at 836-37.
53. Id. at 376, 901 S.W.2d at 841.
54. Id. at 369-70, 901 S.W.2d at 838-39.
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the risk of paralysis, the court concluded that Dr. Aronson's failure to
inform Harriman of the risk was a proximate cause of Harriman's
damages.5 Finally, the court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
submit the issue of informed consent to the jury. 6
III. HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose
adequate information about the treatment or surgery, including the available
alternatives and the collateral risks." The doctrine is based on principles of
.individual autonomy and the patient's right of self-determination.5 8 The
right of self-determination encompasses the notion that every individual has
the right to control what shall be done to his or her own body. 9 Thus, the
doctrine of informed consent promotes patient autonomy and the patient's
right of self-determination by requiring physicians to disclose sufficient
information to allow the patient to make an informed, intelligent decision
concerning whether or not to undergo a particular procedure or treatment.'
Part III of this note identifies the earliest signs of the notion of consent,
discusses the inception of the doctrine of informed consent in society, and
traces the doctrine's development from its birth to its current treatment.
A. Early Medicine
The notion of consent was rarely mentioned in traditional writings in
ancient Greece.6 The Hippocratic writings did not mention the concepts of
55. Id. at 373-74, 901 S.W.2d at 840-41.
56. Id. at 376, 901 S.W.2d at 841.
57. Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheunernan, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.
L. REv. 628, 629 (1970).
58. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 190
(5th ed. 1984).
59. Id. Justice Cardozo provided the classic statement of the concept of self-
determination in stating, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
60. KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 32, at 190.
61. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 60-61 (1986). For example, the Hippocratic Oath became known as a public
pledge to preserve professional responsibilities. However, the principal notions that
accompany our modem idea of professional responsibility, including disclosure and consent,
were not mentioned. In addition, the Corpus Hippocraticum, the first compilation of Western
writings to discuss professional conduct in medicine, also failed to address the fundamental
ideas of consent and patient autonomy. Id. at 61.
[Vol. 19
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skilled communication or deference to the patient's wishes.62
Communication between the physician and patient was important only to the
extent that it was necessary to persuade the patient to follow a certain course
of therapy.63
Medieval medicine borrowed heavily from the Hippocratic traditions.'
Documents from this period indicate that physicians did not believe they
needed to converse with their patients for the purpose of involving the
patients in the decision-making process.65 Instead, physicians carried on
conversations with their patients in order to offer hope and comfort and to
persuade them to follow a suggested method of therapy.66
Although Enlightenment medicine contained many aspects of Hippo-
cratic traditions,67 the emphasis on human progress and the rule of reason
in the eighteenth century influenced many physicians to strive to educate the
public about medicine. 8 Writers on medical ethics in this period believed
that once patients were better educated about the nature of medicine, they
would more easily accept and comply with the orders of their physicians.
69
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, Thomas Percival emerged as a
prominent writer on the history of medical ethics in British medicine.70 His
work was consistent with the ideas embraced in the Hippocratic traditions
and focused in large part on the notion of medical etiquette.71 Percival's
work served as a model for the American Medical Association's first code
of medical ethics adopted in 1847.72 Neither Percival nor the drafters of the
first code of medical ethics emphasized the idea of patient autonomy.73
B. Battery Theory
The notion of patient autonomy was initially identified with an interest
in the protection against an unauthorized touching.74 Through the use of a
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 63.
65. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 7 (1984).
66. Id. According to Katz, "[a]chievement of these objectives demanded an emphasis
on the need to be authoritative, manipulative, and even deceitful." Id.
67. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 64.
68. KATZ, supra note 65, at 13.
69. KATz, supra note 65, at 13.
70. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 67.
71. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 67.
72. KATz, supra note 65, at 17, 21.
73. KATZ, supra note 65, at 20.
74. Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 224 (1985).
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battery theory" the courts began to protect a patient's right to consent to any
intended medical treatment or procedure.76  Four battery decisions in the
early 1 900s have been credited with establishing the basic features of the
doctrine of informed consent." Mohr v. Williams78 was the first of these
early cases. In Mohr, the physician obtained consent to operate only on the
plaintiffs right ear but proceeded to perform a similar operation on her left
ear.79 The plaintiff brought suit against the physician and alleged that the
operation constituted an assault and battery. 0 After the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, the physician made a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.8' The court
denied the physician's motion for judgment but granted a new trial.82 On
appeal, the court stated that if the jury found that the plaintiff had not given
consent to the operation, the physician's conduct would constitute a
technical assault and battery.83
In Pratt v. Davis," the next significant battery decision, the plaintiff's
ovaries and uterus were removed without her consent.85 The court found
that the physician's unauthorized act constituted trespass to the person.
86
Both the Mohr and Pratt decisions are important in that they required the
physicians to obtain consent to perfom particular procedures.87 These two
cases are also significant for their compelling language concerning the right
of self-determination.8
In Rolater v. Strain,89 the court extended the reasonings of Mohr and
Pratt.9° The plaintiff in Rolater consented to an operation on her foot but
75. An intentional touching by a physician to which the patient has not consented is
considered a battery. Shultz, supra note 74, at 224 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 58,
§ 9, at 39). Further, if a physician goes beyond the consent given in a surgical operation and
performs a substantially different act, the physician can be liable to the patient under a
battery theory. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 18, at 118.
76. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PiTT. L. REv. 137,
144 (1977).
77. JAMES E. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT 20 (1978).
78. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).




83. Id. at 16.
84. 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
85. Id. at 563.
86. Id. at 563-65.
87. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 122.
88. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 122.
89. 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913).
90. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 123.
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expressly disagreed to any removal of bone from her foot.9' Believing the
action was necessary to cure the plaintiffs condition, the physician removed
a bone from the plaintiff's foot.92 Although the plaintiff had given consent
to the operation, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff because the
operation was not performed consistently with the agreement between the
parties or the consent given.93 The holding in Rolater reinforced the
patient's right of self-determination by attaching significance to this type of
narrow consent. 94
Justice Benjamin Cardozo delivered the most celebrated early battery
opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.95 In Schloendorff,
the plaintiff alleged that the physician removed a fibroid tumor from the
plaintiff's abdomen without her consent during an examination.96 A portion
of the opinion, which constitutes one of the most frequently cited principles
in the law of informed consent, serves as a classic statement of a patient's
right of self-determination.97 The statement expresses the principle that
every adult of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his or her own body.98 Although Schloendorff failed to discuss the elements
required for an informed decision because the case focused primarily on the
liability of the defendant hospital for acts committed by physicians on the
premises, the case has lasting significance in the law of informed consent. 9
The courts in these early battery cases held that a patient has a right to
decide whether to undergo medical treatment; however, the courts did not
consider whether the physician had given the patient adequate information
to make an informed decision."° Although these cases failed to address this
issue, their combined effect established a theory based on the principle of
91. Rolater, 137 P. at 97.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 97-100.
94. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 123. The case "strengthened the patient's
control by honoring a carefully circumscribed consent that expressly forbade, against the
physician's professional judgment, a procedure within the operative field." FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 123.
95. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overuled in part by Bing v. Thunic, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y.
1957).
96. Id. at 93.
97. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 123 (discussing Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
98. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
99. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 123 (discussing Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at
92).
100. Mark Fajfar, An Economic Analysis of Informed Consent to Medical Care, 80 GEO.
L.J. 1941, 1943 (1992).
1997)
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self-determination that continues to be of great importance throughout the
development of the doctrine of informed consent.'0 '
C. Emergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent
The legal existence of the doctrine of informed consent began in 1957
with the landmark decision of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board
of Trustees.'0 2 In Salgo, the plaintiff's claim was based on the physician's
negligent failure to warn the patient of the inherent risk of paralysis when
undergoing a particular medical procedure.'0 3 The court recognized for the
first time that liability could lie where a physician failed to disclose
information other than that pertaining to the nature of the procedure."°" The
court purported to require what it called "full disclosure" but also left
discretion in the physician regarding the meaning of this standard.0 5
Some believe that the court's circular reasoning did nothing to help
define the law of informed consent but only left the law in utter
confusion."'° Further, the court's failure to provide an analysis of the newly-
announced doctrine left unanswered the question of whether the doctrine
was to be framed in terms of battery or negligence.'07 The actual shift from
battery to negligence did not occur until later.' 8
D. Evolution of the Doctrine-The Shift from Battery to Negligence
While some courts continued to decide the issue of informed consent
under a battery theory,"° other courts began to view the problem as one
101. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 125.
102. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); see Katz, supra note 76, at 149 (citing Salgo,
317 P.2d 170). Salgo is the case in which the term "informed consent" originated. PAUL S.
APPLEBAUM, M.D. ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 39 (1987).
103. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 175, 181.
104. Katz, supra note 76, at 149. Under the previously invoked battery theory, a
physician was only required to disclose information about the nature of the procedure. Katz,
supra note 76, at 144. In Salgo, the court found that, in order to escape liability, a physician
must disclose "any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment." Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
105. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181. The court stated that "in discussing the element of risk a
certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent." Id.
106. Katz, supra note 76, at 150. According to Katz, "full disclosure" and "discretion"
are contradictory terms whose contemporaneous use might allow "discretion" to completely
swallow the "full disclosure" duty. KATZ, supra note 65, at 64.
107. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 126.
108. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 126.
109. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 128-29. See, e.g., Berkey v. Anderson,
[Vol. 19
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more properly analyzed under negligence law."' As courts began to look
more closely at the circumstances surrounding the issue of informed consent,
problems in the application of a battery theory to consent cases began to
surface. "'
1. The Professional Standard
Natanson v. Kline"2 was the first case to expressly base informed
consent liability on a negligence theory rather than a battery theory." 3 In
this case, the plaintiff, subsequent to a mastectomy, underwent cobalt
radiation therapy to prevent the return of breast cancer." 4 She claimed that
she suffered severe injury as a result of the radiation therapy."5  In her
action against the physician, the plaintiff alleged negligence in the medical
treatment she received and in the physician's failure to wam her of the risks
of treatment."6 The court in Natanson set forth a duty of disclosure similar
to the one announced in Salgo."7 This new duty was based on the
fundamental principle"' of self-determination, which purportedly lies at the
foundation of the doctrine of informed consent.' 19
82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Gray v.
Grurmagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
110. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 129.
111. Shultz, supra note 74, at 225. The battery theory carried with it a narrow disclosure
standard under which only information about the nature of the procedure had to be disclosed.
KATZ, supra note 65, at 144. Thus, although the procedure or treatment might have
improved the health of the patient or have been of a type to which the patient probably
would have agreed, the patient could recover as long as he could show that he was unaware
of what was going to be done to him. KATZ, supra note 65, at 145. Further, if a plaintiff
brought a claim based on a battery theory, he was not required to prove that he would have
refused treatment had he received all relevant information about the nature of the procedure.
KATZ, supra note 65, at 145.
112. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
113. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 129.
114. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1095.
115. Id. at 1098.
116. Id. at 1098-99.
117. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 130. The court stated that the physician
must "disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary the nature of the
ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives,
and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body ..
KATZ, supra note 65, at 66 (quoting Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106).
118. KATZ, supra note 65, at 66.
119. KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 32, at 190. The court noted that "Anglo-American
law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It follows that each man
is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly
prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might
well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The negligence theory as a basis for liability in informed consent law
brought with it additional burdens for the plaintiff.2 ' For example, a
majority of jurisdictions require the plaintiff to provide expert medical
testimony to establish a professional standard of care and prove that the
defendant physician breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff.'2 '
The use of a professional standard has been criticized by some who argue
that a definable professional standard of disclosure might not exist.' 2 Some
also argue that a professional standard may be too burdensome to a plaintiff
who might not be able to penetrate the "conspiracy of silence,"' 23 which is
alleged to exist in the medical community. 24 Because the battery theory did
not involve a professional standard of care, the need for expert testimony
would not have been as relevant had informed consent continued under a
battery theory rather than negligence.
25
The causation requirement also proves to be more burdensome under
a negligence theory because many jurisdictions require the plaintiff to show
that he would not have consented to the medical treatment had he been
adequately informed. 26 Under a battery claim, the plaintiff only needed to
show that he did not give consent to the procedure that was performed.
27
Thus, the new basis for liability under a negligence theory invoked the
fundamental requirements of a negligence claim in that the plaintiff was
required to prove that the physician's breach of a professional standard of
care was a proximate cause of his injury. 2  The application of a profes-
sional standard of care as announced in Natanson established the majority
not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by any form or artifice
or deception." Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104.
120. KATZ, supra note 65, at 69.
121. LUDLAM, supra note 77, at 26. In Natanson, the court framed the professional
standard by stating, "The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances. How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this
difficult situation involves primarily a question of medical judgment." Natanson, 350 P.2d
at 1106.
122. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 57, at 636-37.
123. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 57, at 637. This phrase refers to the "well known
reluctance of doctors to testify against one another." KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 32,
at 188.
124. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 57, at 637.
125. KATZ, supra note 65, at 69.
126. LUDLAM, supra note 77, at 25.
127. KATZ, supra note 76, at 144-45; see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
128. KATZ, supra note 76, at 152-53.
[Vol. 19
TORTS
view in the United States,129 and the Natanson decision established the law
on informed consent for the next twelve years in almost all jurisdictions. 30
2. The Reasonable Patient Standard
Three landmark cases in 1972 rejected the professional standard
announced in Natanson and invoked a patient-centered reasonable person
standard.' In light of these decisions, it appeared that informed consent
might take a new turn toward a greater protection of self-determination.'32
However, this shift merely came to represent the minority view.'33
Canterbury v. Spence,'34 the first case to establish a minority view on
the standard of disclosure, is a leading case on the issue of informed
consent.'35 The court in Canterbury rejected the professional standard with
respect to disclosure and instead announced a new rule.'3 6 In Canterbury,
the plaintiff submitted to a laminectomy'37 in order to remedy the cause of
a severe pain between his shoulder blades.' s Subsequent to the operation,
the plaintiff was left paralyzed from the waist down after experiencing a fall
from his bed while he was left unattended.' The plaintiff filed an action
against the physician and alleged, among other things, negligence in the
performance of the operation and negligence in the failure to inform him of
the risk of paralysis prior to the procedure. 40
In its analysis of the proper standard of care, the court in Canterbury
rejected the professional standard followed by the majority of courts.' 4 '
129. LUDLAM, supra note 77, at 28. Arkansas also applies the majority view regarding
the standard of care. Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980). See infra part
III.E.
130. KATZ, supra note 65, at 65.
131. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 132. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d
676 (R.I. 1972).
132. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 132.
133. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 133.
134. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
135. LUDLAM, supra note 77, at 31.
136. KATZ, supra note 65, at 75-76.
137. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776. A laminectomy is defined as the excision of the
posterior arch of a vertebra. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL
DICTIONARY 403 (1987).
138. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776-77.
139. Id. at 777.
140. Id. at 778.
141. Id. at 783. In its criticism of the majority view, the court noted that "[riespect for
the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law
for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves."
Id. at 784.
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Rather, the court adopted a standard of conduct that is measured by what is
reasonable under the circumstances involved.'42 The new standard had the
concept of ordinary care at its core.' 43 However, the standard also seemed
to reserve a great deal of discretion in physicians.'"
The court elaborated on the new standard by discussing its scope of
disclosure. 45 The court noted that the scope should not be defined in terms
of medical professional judgment because this would be inconsistent with
the patient's right of self-determination.'46 The court adopted a materiality
standard that embodied the view that the scope of the physician's duty of
disclosure should be measured by the patient's needs.'
The Canterbury decision also addressed the issue of causation.' The
court ruled that causation existed if the patient would have foregone the
treatment or procedure had he been adequately informed of all significant
risks.'49 In its analysis of the problem, the court chose to evaluate causation
objectively in terms of what a prudent person in the position of the plaintiff
would have decided had he been informed of all the material risks. 50 The
court noted that a standard that evaluated causation from the standpoint of
what a particular plaintiff would have chosen would present too much risk
due to its hypothetical nature. 5 '
Another 1972 decision that joined Canterbury in establishing a minority
view in the United States was Wilkinson v. Vesey.'52  In this case, the
142. Id. at 785. The court stated that "[w]hen medical judgment enters the picture and
for that reason the special standard controls, prevailing medical practice must be given its just
due. In all other instances, however, the general standard exacting ordinary care applies, and
that standard is set by law." Id.
143. Id.
144. Katz, supra note 76, at 155. Katz criticized the court for its failure to define the
meaning of "just due" as used in the court's statement of the new standard. Katz, supra
note 76, at 155. According to Katz, the court appeared to establish a mandatory rule of
disclosure, yet it really allowed physicians to fail to comply when "medical judgment"
applies. Katz, supra note 76, at 157.
145. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
146. Id.
147. Id. In defining the physician's duty, the court noted that "[t]he scope of the
physician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and
that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether
a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks
potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked." Id. at 786-87.
148. Id. at 790.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 791.
151. Id. at 790. The court explained that the use of a subjective standard "places the
physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness. It places the fact finder in the
position of deciding whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question is to be
credited." Id. at 790-91.
152. 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
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plaintiff underwent radiation therapy subsequent to the defendants' diagnosis
of a probable lymphoma.'53 As a result of the radiation therapy, the skin on
the plaintiffs chest and back began to deteriorate and eventually required
plastic surgery."s The plaintiff brought suit against the physicians and
claimed, among other things, that the physicians failed to obtain her consent
because they did not disclose all the possible risks of the treatment. 5'
In its discussion of the appropriate standard of care, the Wilkinson court
criticized the majority's professional standard.'56 The Wilkinson court noted
that the requirement of expert testimony undermines the fundamental
principle underlying the doctrine of informed consent, which is the patient's
right to do as she wishes with her own body.'57
Finally, in Cobbs v. Grant,5 ' the plaintiff had to undergo several
operations due to substantially adverse consequences that resulted from the
initial treatment of a duodenal ulcer.'59 The plaintiff sued the physician,
alleging negligence in the performance of the operation and negligence in
the failure to inform him of the inherent risks involved. 6° The court
rejected the professional standard and invoked a reasonable disclosure
standard.' 6'
Canterbury, Wilkinson, and Cobbs rejected the use of a professional
standard of disclosure in analyzing the issue of informed consent and instead
adopted a patient-centered reasonable person standard. 62 This shift merely
established the minority view,'63 while the majority of jurisdictions,
eventually including Arkansas," 4 continued to invoke a professional standard
of disclosure in informed consent cases.
65
153. Id. at 681.
154. Id. At trial, testimony was presented to show that the plaintiff sought plastic
surgery because of burns received as a result of the radiation therapy. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 686-87.
157. Id. at 688.
158. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
159. Id. at 4-5.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 10. The court stated, "[W]e hold, as an integral part of the physician's overall
obligation to the patient there is a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with
respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially involved in each."
Id.
162. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 132.
163. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 61, at 133.
164. See infra part III.E.
165. LUDLAM, supra note 77, at 28.
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E. Informed Consent in Arkansas Law
The issue of informed consent did not make an appearance in Arkansas
until 1976 in Pegram v. Sisco,'" a federal case interpreting Arkansas law.
In Pegram, the plaintiff underwent radiation therapy for cervical cancer.
167
After suffering from severe aftereffects of the therapy, the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant for failure to obtain her informed consent to the
radiation therapy.16  Another physician made the primary diagnosis and
recommended treatment, but the defendant actually performed the
procedure.169 The plaintiff testified that neither the nature of the procedure
nor the possible alternatives were explained to her by either physician. 7°
At trial, two physicians testified that it was standard medical practice
in Fayetteville and Little Rock to inform a potential patient prior to this type
of radiation therapy of the possible consequences, risks, and alternative
procedures.' The defendant argued that, because he was only a consultant,
the other physician was responsible for obtaining the plaintiff's informed
consent. 1
72
The federal court recognized that the doctrine of informed consent had
never been addressed by an Arkansas court. 173 However, the court, citing
Canterbury, acknowledged that a physician's failure to obtain an informed
consent may give rise to liability in negligence. 17  The court held that the
defendant's conduct was not consistent with medical community standards
when he assumed consent had been obtained by the other physician and
failed to obtain consent personally. 175 The court determined that a physician
must disclose all material aspects of a procedure and all risks that would be
material to the patient's decision; however, the court left the physician a
significant amount of discretion to make the appropriate disclosure.
7 6
166. 406 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ark. 1976).
167. Id. at 777-78.
168. Id. at 778.
169. Id. at 777-78.
170. Id. at 779.
171. Id. The plaintiff testified that neither physician informed her of the possible
complications of the procedure or that a hysterectomy was a possible alternative. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 778.
174. Id. at 778-79. The court noted that "the physician is held liable when he
inexcusably fails to disclose risks and dangers of the proposed treatment which other
members of his profession or specialty would disclose to the patient." Id. at 779.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 779-80. "The extent of the disclosure depends upon the weighing of various
factors by the physician. He must give his patient sufficient information so that the consent
is an informed one, and yet he may withhold information if its disclosure would be harmful
or detrimental to the patient's best interest." Id. at 780.
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Although the court in Pegram failed to clearly define or label the
specific standard to apply in informed consent cases, the reasoning of the
court has been described as an application of the professional medical
standard of disclosure.'77 Only three years after the Pegram decision, the
professional standard of disclosure, which is applied by a majority of the
courts in the United States, was adopted by the Arkansas Legislature in Act
709 of 1979.178 Whether the issue in Pegram provoked the adoption of the
act is unclear. The influence of this legislation was reflected a year later in
Fuller v. Starnes,79 the first Arkansas case to discuss the proper treatment
of the doctrine of informed consent under the then recently-adopted
Arkansas law.
In Fuller, the plaintiff alleged that the physician failed to warn the
plaintiff's late mother about the dangers of Demerol before prescribing the
drug to relieve pain.8 ° The Supreme Court of Arkansas acknowledged that
a physician's duty to warn a patient of potential risks of medical treatment
was well established, but recognized that jurisdictions vary in their definition
of the scope of this duty.'
Citing Canterbury, Wilkinson, and Cobbs, the court noted that the
minority view dictates that a physician's duty of disclosure is measured by
the patient's needs and requires the disclosure of all information material to
the patient's decision."2 In its explanation of the rationale behind the
177. ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
78 (1981). The Pegram court provided that:
In deciding what should be disclosed, the physician must possess and, using his
best judgment, apply with reasonable care the degree of skill and learning
ordinarily possessed and used by members of his profession in good standing,
engaged in the same type of practice in the locality in which he practices, or in
a similar locality.
Pegram, 406 F. Supp. at 780 (citing Walls v. Boyett, 216 Ark. 541, 226 S.W.2d 552 (1950)).
178. 1979 ARK. AcTS 709 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie
1987)). The relevant portion of the statute provides that:
Where the plaintiff claims that a medical care provider failed to supply adequate
information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was
performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider
did not supply that type of information regarding the . . . surgery as would
customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or
other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care
providers with similar training and experience at the time of the... surgery in
the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987).
179. 268 Ark. 476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980).
180. Id. at 477-78, 597 S.W.2d at 88-89.
181. Id. at 478, 597 S.W.2d at 89.
182. Id.
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standard, the court pointed out that the patient's fundamental right of self-
determination rests at the center of the minority view.'83 The court
explained the premise of the majority view as one that considers disclosure
to be governed by medical judgment."
After its precise summary of the opposing views of disclosure, the
court, persuaded by the legislature's recent enactment, adopted the majority
view"' and held that the physician's duty to disclose is measured by the
customary practice of physicians in the community in which the physician
practices or in a similar community.'86 Furthermore, the court required that
the plaintiff produce expert testimony in order to establish the appropriate
standard of care so that the jury could determine whether the physician's
conduct constituted a breach of that duty.'87 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff could not recover
due to her failure to provide expert testimony on the standard of care.'88
The court recognized that the professional standard of disclosure always
requires expert testimony.
89
Failure to satisfy the requirement of expert testimony resulted in a
judgment against another plaintiff in Grice v. Atkinson. 90 In Grice, the
physician suggested removal of one of the plaintiff's wisdom teeth through
oral surgery but did not, according to the plaintiff, inform her that her
tongue might be permanently numb as a result of the procedure.' 9'
The plaintiff introduced the deposition of a board-certified oral
surgeon.' 92  In the deposition, the surgeon stated that he thought the
permission obtained through the consent form was inadequate because it
183. Id. "Emphasizing the right of the patient to control what happens to his body, the
minority view is undergirded by the proposition that what a patient should be told about
future medical treatment is primarily a human judgment." Id.
184. Id. "[The majority view] emphasizes the interest of the medical profession to be
relatively free from vexatious and costly litigation and holds that what a patient should be
told about future medical treatment is primarily a medical decision." Id.
185. The court in Fuller was not obligated to adopt and apply the majority view reflected
in the new act, because the facts of the case arose before the legislation was officially
adopted. Id. at 479, 597 S.W.2d at 90.
186. Id. at 478-79, 597 S.W.2d at 89-90.
187. Id. at 479, 597 S.W.2d at 90.
188. Id. "[P]laintiff did not produce expert medical evidence to establish a disclosure
standard for the jury to assess the reasonableness of [the physician's] conduct. The trial
judge concluded that this evidentiary omission was fatal to plaintiff's case." Id. at 477, 597
S.W.2d at 88-89.
189. Id. at 479, 597 S.W.2d at 90.
190. 308 Ark. 637, 826 S.W.2d 810 (1992).
191. Id. at 639, 826 S.W.2d at 811.
192. Id. at 640, 826 S.W.2d at 812.
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failed to provide a complete description of the nature of the numbness.' 93
The court found that the surgeon's testimony was insufficient to satisfy the
burden of proof set by statute 94 because he did not provide the type of
information given by other dentists in the same or a similar locality as that
of the defendant.' 95 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in
granting the defendant's motion for directed verdict. 196
Brumley v. Naples,9 7 the last significant Arkansas case to address the
doctrine of informed consent before Aronson, is also representative of a
plaintiffs defeat due to an inability to satisfy the burden of producing
sufficient expert testimony. In Brumley, the plaintiff experienced unex-
pected complications, including persistent coldness and numbness in her
toes, following an operation on the foot. 9 8 The plaintiff sued the physician
under theories of negligence in the performance of the operation, failure to
obtain informed consent, and breach of contract. 99
The court noted that the plaintiff, pursuant to statutory law, 200 has the
burden of proving the applicable standard of care and the physician's breach
of the standard.20' The court continued by declaring that this burden
requires the production of expert testimony when the alleged negligence
cannot be understood by the jury as a matter of common knowledge. 22 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs expert could not offer testimony as
required by statute; therefore, the plaintiff could not recover.
203
Although the Pegram decision was not analyzed in light of the
Arkansas statutory provisions addressing the issue of informed consent, the
case remains significant in that it represents the first attempt to analyze
informed consent under Arkansas law. Fuller, Grice, and Brumley were all
193. Id.
194. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); see also supra note 178.
195. Grice, 308 Ark. at 642-43, 826 S.W.2d at 813. The court's reasoning was that the
expert witness did not make:
any attempt to compare the locale of [his] practice to that of [the defendant's].
We are not told the size, character or availability of facilities of the community
where [the expert witness] practices. Indeed, his testimony does not even identify
the location of his practice. There is no attempt to compare the similarity of
medical/dental facilities, practices and advantages available in Pine Bluff with
those existing in comparable localities with which [the expert witness] is familiar.
Id. at 642-43, 826 S.W.2d at 813.
196. Id. at 638, 826 S.W.2d at 811.
197. 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995).
198. Id. at 312, 896 S.W.2d at 862.
199. Id.
200. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); see also supra note 178.





decided pursuant to the legislation enacted several years after Pegram2°4 and
demonstrate the manner in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas has
applied the statute in informed consent actions prior to Aronson v.
Harriman.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Aronson v. Harriman,2 °5 the Supreme Court of Arkansas structured
its reasoning by addressing and disposing of each of three arguments raised
by Dr. Aronson on appeal. Dr. Aronson claimed that the trial court erred
in denying his various motions for directed verdict on the grounds that
Harriman failed to produce sufficient evidence on the issue of informed
consent as required by statute.' Dr. Aronson also contended that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the basis that
Harriman failed to prove that Dr. Aronson's conduct was the proximate
cause of his injuries.207 Dr. Aronson's final claim was that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on the issue of informed consent.208
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The court began its analysis by addressing Dr. Aronson's argument that
Harriman failed to produce competent evidence as required by statute.2 9
Dr. Aronson argued that Harriman did not illustrate that the information Dr.
Aronson provided him about the procedure, including any potential risks,
was inconsistent with information that an orthopedic surgeon practicing in
the same or a similar locality would normally give a patient in order to
obtain informed consent.210  Based upon this argument, Dr. Aronson's
position was that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed
verdict.
211
On appeal, the court recognized that the framework for analyzing the
issue of informed consent is set out by statute.21 2 The relevant statutory
204. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); see also supra note 178.
205. 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995).
206. Id. at 366-67, 901 S.W.2d at 837.
207. Id. at 365-74, 901 S.W.2d at 837-41.
208. Id. at 374-76, 901 S.W.2d at 841.
209. Id. at 366-67, 901 S.W.2d at 837. Dr. Aronson contended that Harriman failed to
satisfy the requirements of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987). See supra
note 178.
210. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 366-67, 901 S.W.2d at 837.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 367, 901 S.W.2d at 837. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie
1987); see also supra note 178.
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provision provides that, in an action based on lack of informed consent, the
plaintiff must prove that the physician failed to supply the type of informa-
tion about the surgery that other physicians with similar training and
experience in the same or a similar locality would have given a patient in
the plaintiffs position. The court went on to discuss the holdings in
Fuller v. Starnes,214 Grice v. Atkinson, 215 and Brumley v. Naples, 21%hree
previous cases in which the issue of informed consent was analyzed in light
of the Arkansas statute.217 The court held that the plaintiffs in these cases
could not recover because they failed to produce expert testimony sufficient
to satisfy the applicable statutory requirement.218
The court noted that Dr. Aronson's argument would have had merit had
Dr. Aronson rested on his motion for directed verdict at the close of
Harriman's case.21 9 However, the court found that Dr. Aronson provided
sufficient evidence on the physician's duty to disclose in the presentation of
his own case, thereby waiving any objection to the issue.22 In other words,
the court concluded that Dr. Aronson himself established the required proof
of the standard of care 2' Dr. Aronson provided testimony which indicated
that, when confronted with a patient who plans to undergo spinal surgery,
it is routine for him to discuss complications such as bleeding, infection, the
effects of anesthesia, neurological damage, and the risk of death.222 The
court also considered the testimony of Dr. Albert Sanders, an orthopedic
surgeon who testified on behalf of Dr. Aronson.' On cross-examination,
Dr. Sanders stated that paralysis is a complication of scoliosis surgery of
which a patient must be informed and failure to disclose the risk would be
a breach of the standard of care.224
In consideration of the testimony provided by Dr. Sanders, as well as
Dr. Aronson's own testimony, the court concluded that the trial court did not
err in denying the motion for directed verdict.225 Thus, the court allowed
213. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987); see supra note 178.
214. 268 Ark. 476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980); see supra part HI.E.
215. 308 Ark. 637, 826 S.W.2d 10 (1992); see supra part III.E.
216. 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995); see supra part III.E.
217. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 367-68, 901 S.W.2d at 837.
218. See supra part HI.E.
219. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 369, 901 S.W.2d at 838.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Specifically, Dr. Aronson stated that "[w]hcn you operate on the spinal cord and
do scoliosis surgery, there is no way not to talk about the potential for neurologic injury."
Id.
223. Id. at 370, 901 S.W.2d at 838-39.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 370, 901 S.W.2d at 839.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Dr. Aronson, the defendant in the case, to supply the required proof of the
standard of care.
B. Proximate Causation
The court then addressed Dr. Aronson's second argument on appeal.
Dr. Aronson claimed that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict on the basis that Douglas Harriman failed to state, as
required by statute, that he would not have undergone the surgery had he
known of the risk of paralysis.226 More specifically, Dr. Aronson alleged
that Harriman did not prove that failure to inform him of the potential risk
of paralysis was a proximate cause of his injuries."'
In analyzing the issue, the court considered the plain language of the
applicable statute.22 The court agreed with Harriman's contention that
whether the injured party would have undergone the procedure had he
known of the risk is a material issue for the court to consider rather than an
element a plaintiff must prove.229 The court went on to consider Dr.
Aronson's argument that Harriman failed to prove proximate causation.230
As authority for his position, Dr. Aronson presented commentary on the
issue of causation in informed consent cases.23' According to the cited
commentary, a plaintiff should not be allowed to recover if the plaintiff
cannot state with certainty that he would have foregone the procedure or
treatment had he been fully informed of all risks. 2  The commentator based
this view upon the argument that a plaintiff cannot claim a violation of his
right of self-determination in the absence of a clear statement indicating the
decision he would have made with sufficient disclosure. 3
226. Id. at 370-71, 901 S.W.2d at 839. Dr. Aronson based his claim on the statutory
language of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Miechie 1987). The applicable portion
of the statute provides, "In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements
of [ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206] (b)(1) .... the following matters shall also be considered
as material issues: ... (C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment,
procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he did not wish to be
informed thereof .... " ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1987).
227. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 370-71, 901 S.W.2d at 839.
228. Id. at 371-72, 901 S.W.2d at 839; see supra note 226.
229. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 372, 901 S.W.2d at 839.
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice
and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 621
(1986)).
232. Id, (citing Seidelson, supra note 231, at 640).
233. Id. (citing Seidelson, supra note 231, at 640).
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The court rejected Dr. Aronson's assertion that the jury should not have
been allowed to consider the issue of informed consent because Harriman
could not state with absolute certainty that he would have foregone the
surgery had he known of the risk of paralysis.2" Rather, the court adopted
an objective standard under which causation is evaluated in light of whether
a reasonable and prudent patient in Harriman's position would have
undergone the surgery had the physician disclosed the risk of paralysis.235
The court also noted that the adoption of an objective standard on the issue
of causation is consistent with Arkansas statutory law, which provides that
the injured party's testimony regarding what the party would have done had
the physician disclosed all material information is only one factor to
consider and is not dispositive of the issue.236
Therefore, the court found that the jury was able to conclude that a
reasonable, prudent patient would not have consented to the surgery.237 The
court also noted that the jury was free to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses regarding the issue of whether Dr. Aronson properly disclosed the
risk of paralysis.23 The court found that it was proper for the jury to
consider the issue of informed consent and that it was within the province
of the jury to conclude that Dr. Aronson failed to provide Harriman with the
type of information that would ordinarily be given to a patient by an
orthopedic surgeon practicing in the same or a similar locality.239 In light
of these findings, the court concluded that Dr. Aronson's failure to disclose
the potential risk of paralysis was a proximate cause of Harriman's
injuries.2 °
234. Id. at 372-73, 901 S.W.2d at 840.
235. Id. at 373, 901 S.W.2d at 840. The court addressed the danger of applying a
subjective standard and noted that the use of the standard would allow the testimony of the
plaintiff to be the controlling factor. The court stated that "proof of causation under a
subjective standard would ultimately turn on the credibility of the hindsight of a person
seeking recovery after he had experienced a most undesirable result. Such a test puts the
physician in 'jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness."' Id. (quoting Sard v.
Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (Md. 1977)). The court noted that the adoption of an objective
standard was consistent "with a majority of cases which have wrestled with this issue." Id.
at 373, 901 S.W.2d at 840.
236. Id. at 373, 901 S.W.2d at 840. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Michie
1987).
237. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 374, 901 S.W.2d at 840.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 374, 901 S.W.2d at 840-41.
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C. Informed Consent Instruction
The final issue the court addressed was Dr. Aronson's argument that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of informed
consent.24" ' Dr. Aronson alleged that there was a lack of sufficient
competent evidence in the record to submit the issue of informed consent
to the jury.242 In reliance on its conclusion regarding the issue of sufficiency
of the evidence in the first part of the appeal, the court rejected Dr.
Aronson's argument.243 The court concluded that there was sufficient
competent evidence to justify the trial court's submission of the issue of
informed consent, as well as related instructions on the issue, to the jury.'"
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Prior case law reflects the Supreme Court of Arkansas's recognition
and strict application of statutory law to disputes in which informed consent
was at issue.245 Prior to Aronson v. Harriman, this procedure resulted in a
trend of defeats for plaintiffs who were unable to meet their statutorily-
mandated burden of presenting expert testimony on the standard of care in
informed consent cases.2" However, in Aronson, Douglas Harriman, a
victim of paralysis at the age of eighteen, recovered on the basis of lack of
informed consent even though he failed to satisfy the statutory requirements
of his cause of action. Thus, the holding of the Supreme Court of Arkansas
in Aronson is inconsistent with prior case law, most notably the decision in
Grice v. Atkinson.
247
The court's treatment of the statutory requirement that the plaintiff
produce expert testimony on the standard of care establishes the inconsis-
tency between the Aronson and Grice decisions. 24' Although Dr.
Warbritton, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon with a solo practice in
Oakland, California, testified on behalf of Harriman, he failed to provide
information regarding the customary practices of an orthopedic surgeon
241. Id. at 374, 901 S.W.2d at 841.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 376, 901 S.W.2d at 841.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Brumley v. Naples, 320 Ark. 310, 896 S.W.2d 860 (1995); Grice v.
Atkinson, 308 Ark. 637, 826 S.W.2d 810 (1992); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 597
S.W.2d 88 (1980). See supra part III.E.
246. See supra part III.E.
247. See supra part mI.E.
248. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 366-70, 901 S.W.2d at 837-39; Grice, 308 Ark. at 640-43, 826
* S.W.2d at 812-13. See supra part III.E.
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practicing in Little Rock or in a similar community.249 In Grice, although
the plaintiff's expert testified that the plaintiff's consent to oral surgery was
inadequate, the court granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict.25
The court noted that the plaintiff's expert witness did not attempt to
compare the locality of his practice with that of the defendant nor did the
expert witness identify the location of his practice or compare the facilities
and practices available in Arkansas with those with which he was familiar.251
In Grice, the failure of the expert witness to provide such testimony
destroyed the plaintiff's case.252 In light of this result, one could reasonably
conclude that Harriman's failure to produce expert testimony of the type
required in Grice would have been fatal to his case. However, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas avoided this result by permitting Dr. Aronson's
testimony, coupled with the statement made by Dr. Sanders, to satisfy
Harriman's burden of proof on the standard of care.253
Dr. Aronson testified that he routinely discusses the risk of neurological
damage with a patient who plans to undergo spinal surgery, and Dr. Sanders
stated that failure to disclose the risk of paralysis to such a patient
constitutes a breach of the duty of care. 2" In light of the Grice decision,
however, this evidence was arguably insufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement regarding the physician's standard of care.255
The statute explicitly states that the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving that the physician failed to supply the injured person with the type
of information about the surgery that other physicians of similar training and
experience in the same or a similar locality would have ordinarily given a
patient in the position of the injured person.256 Neither Dr. Aronson nor Dr.
Sanders testified as to the type of information that comparable physicians
ordinarily give to a patient in Douglas Harriman's position.257 The type of
evidence articulated and mandated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
249. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 364, 901 S.W.2d at 835. Harriman conceded that the trial
court refused to allow Dr. Warbritton to testify on the standard of care for informed consent.
Appellee's Brief at 34, Aronson (No. 94-1218).
250. Grice, 308 Ark. at 640, 643, 826 S.W.2d at 812, 813.
251. Id. at 642-43, 826 S.W.2d at 813; see supra note 195.
252. Grice, 308 Ark. at 643, 826 S.W.2d at 813; see supra notes 190-96 and
accompanying text.
253. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 369, 901 S.W.2d at 838.
254. Id. at 369-70, 901 S.W.2d at 838-39.
255. See Grice, 308 Ark. 642-43, 826 S.W.2d at 813; see also supra note 195.
256. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (1987); see also supra note 195.
257. See supra part IV.
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Grice258 was clearly not present in the Aronson case.259 This omission
renders these two decisions irreconcilable.
In addition, the court adopted an objective standard under which to
evaluate causation2' despite the plain language of the statute that addresses
the relevance of this factor to the plaintiff's burden of proof.26' The statute
provides that a material inquiry to make when addressing the issue of
causation is whether, having been fully informed of the risks, the injured
party would have undergone the surgery.262 Although this language
describes one of several factors for the court to consider and is arguably
merely directory in nature, the court's adoption of a subjective standard
under which to evaluate causation would have logically followed in light of
this statutory guidance.
Moreover, a closer look at the statutory language supports a compelling
argument that the court's adoption of an objective standard was contrary to
the explicit direction of the statute. 263 The statute outlines four factors as
material issues in the determination of whether the plaintiff has satisfied his
burden of proof in an action based on informed consent.2' . One of the
provisions speaks in terms of "a person of ordinary intelligence and
awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person. '265  Other
provisions emphasize the position of the "injured party."'26 This difference
in language suggests a legislative intent to distinguish between objective and
subjective considerations. However, the court concluded that the proper
determination was whether a reasonable patient in Harriman's position
267would have undergone the surgery. The court recognized that the danger
of using a subjective standard for determining causation would subject a
physician to a disgruntled patient's 'hindsight and bitterness.' ' 268 However,
the application of an objective standard in Aronson failed to safeguard the
physician and instead protected an uncertain plaintiff.
258. See Grice, 308 Ark. at 642-43, 826 S.W.2d at 813; see also supra note 195.
259. See supra part IV.
260. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 373, 901 S.W.2d at 840.
261. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1987); see also supra note
226.
262. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1987); see also supra note
226.
263. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2) (Michie 1987).
264. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2) (Michie 1987).
265. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(A) (Michie 1987).
266. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(2)(B), (C) (Michie 1987).
267. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 373-74, 901 S.W.2d at 840.




Although the doctrine of informed consent has been in existence for
almost forty years,269 the absence of precise and consistent rules has resulted
in unpredictable outcomes. 270  Aronson v. Harriman is illustrative of a
decision that could not have been foreseen in light of previous Arkansas
271cases involving informed consent. In Aronson, the court allowed Douglas
Harriman to recover even though the evidence regarding the appropriate
standard of care came during the presentation of Dr. Aronson's case and was
arguably insufficient in light of Arkansas statutory law272 and case law. 273
The Supreme Court of Arkansas also adopted an objective standard for
determining causation despite the explicit statutory language indicating that
a material inquiry to make is whether the injured party would have
undergone the surgery had he been adequately informed.274 In effect, the
court permitted Douglas Harriman to recover even though he could not state
that he would have foregone the surgery had he known of the risk of
paralysis.2 5  Although some proponents of patient autonomy might be
encouraged by the Aronson decision, the question of whether the Supreme
Court of Arkansas will return to strict adherence to the requirements and
directions of statutory law in the future remains.
Elizabeth Sudbury Langston
269. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
270. Katz, supra note 76, at 168-73.
271. See supra part III.E.
272. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b)(1) (Michie 1987).
273. See supra part III.E.
274. Aronson, 321 Ark. at 373, 901 S.W.2d at 840. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-
206(b)(2)(C) (Michie 1987).
275. Id. at 373-74, 901 S.W.2d at 840-41.
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